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 Conscious Thinking 
David Pitt 
 Late twentieth-century theories of thought and thinking in the analytic philosophical 
tradition focused on the problem of how it is that presumably purely physical beings such as 
ourselves can be in states (or have brains that are in states) that are about things, or have 
“intentionality,” and that can bear logical relations to each other such that sequences of them 
may be rational or irrational.  Typically, such theories ignored the fact that some thoughts are 
conscious, on the assumption that what makes a state a thought and what might make it 
conscious are metaphysically distinct.  In recent years, however, the number of theorists holding 
that no adequate theory of intentionality can leave out consciousness has been growing, and the 
philosophical orthodoxies of the last century have increasingly come into question. 
 To say that a mental state is intentional is to say that it has a content – something 
analogous to the meaning of a sentence.1  The sentence ‘Blood is red’, for example, has (in 
English) a particular meaning, and in virtue of this meaning (derived from the meanings of its 
constituent terms) is about blood, and says that it is red.  The sentence ‘Mud is brown’, in 
contrast, has a different meaning, and is about something else and says something different about 
it.  Further, these sentences have, in virtue of their meanings, truth conditions – that is, they 
specify the worldly conditions under which they are true (or false) – as well as logical properties 
– relations of consistency, inconsistency and entailment to other sentences.  The sentence ‘Blood 
 
1  I use the term ‘intentional’ here in application only to propositional attitudes and the 
constituent thoughts that render them intentional, skirting the issue of the intentionality of 
perceptual and other sensory experiences. 
is red’ is true iff blood is red, and false otherwise; ‘Blood is red’ and ‘Mud is brown’ are 
logically consistent with each other (they can both be true); ‘Blood is red’ and ‘Blood is brown’ 
are not consistent with each other (they can’t both be true); and ‘Blood is red and mud is brown’ 
logically entails ‘Mud is brown’.  Exactly analogous things may be said about the thoughts that 
blood is red and that mud is brown.  (Indeed, it’s a traditional assumption in analytic philosophy 
of language that the meanings of sentences derive from (or are) the contents of the thoughts they 
are (by convention) used to express.)  Thus, thoughts have contents, which determine their truth 
conditions and logical relations to each other.2 
 Philosophical theories of intentionality and rationality have typically been committed to  
“naturalism” (the view that these phenomena can be explained in terms consistent with the 
natural sciences – in particular, neurophysiology, biology, and, ultimately, physics), and have 
typically sidestepped the question of consciousness.  Attempts to explain the propositional 
attitudes (belief, hope, desire, fear), their contents (what they’re beliefs in, hopes or desires for, 
fears of), as well as the logical relations among them, have generally not taken account of the 
fact that some of them are conscious.  The reason for this is, I believe, twofold.  On the one hand, 
since there’s very good evidence that there are unconscious thoughts and thought processes, it 
would seem that what makes a mental state a thought has little, or even nothing, to do with what 
makes it conscious.  On the other hand, this is a lucky break, since no one has the slightest idea 
what consciousness is or how to provide an explanation of how it could arise from brain activity.  
If  intentionality and consciousness can vary independently of one another, the latter may safely 
be ignored when theorizing about the former.  Whatever explanation there may be for 
consciousness generally may simply be combined with whatever theories of intentionality and 
 
2  Jerry Fodor (beginning with Fodor 1975) has championed the view that in fact we think 
rationality turn out to be the right ones in order to explain conscious thought and thinking.   
 In addition, there has been widespread optimism about the feasibility of naturalistic 
explanations of rationality and intentionality.  The conception of the mind as a kind of computer, 
and of thinking as a kind of rule-governed symbol manipulation, gained new life in philosophy 
through the work of Hilary Putnam, who hypothesized that the mind is a kind of Turing machine 
(see Putnam 1973/2002 and Turing 1950).3  Turing showed how a merely material device – and 
one of no particularly special or interesting physical type – could engage in characteristically 
intellectual operations such as addition, subtraction, multiplication and division.  A thing needn’t 
have an immaterial soul in order to have a mind.  (Turing himself argued that a computational 
device that was conversationally indistinguishable from a human being would thereby literally 
deserve the honorific ‘thinker’.  Contemporary cognitive science has explicitly extended the 
realm of the computational (at least in principle) to virtually every “mental” operation.) 
 The problem of intentionality – the problem of how it could be that a physical object 
could be in states that are about things – is also widely believed to have been (as far as 
philosophers are concerned) essentially solved by an approach introduced into the philosophical 
literature by Fred Dretske (Dretske 1981).  Dretske showed how a merely material object could 
be in states that carry information about the existence or condition of other things, and argued 
that the property of carrying information is a kind of proto-intentionality.  The rings of a tree, for 
instance, represent the tree’s age; the presence of smoke indicates the presence of some sort of 
combustion; the occurrence of a certain sort of spots on the skin means measles.  These relations, 
which hold in virtue of lawful relations of cause and effect between the phenomena, are 
sufficiently like the “aboutness” of intentionality (witness the language we use to describe them) 
 
in a “language of thought,” a system of mental representations with sentence-like structures. 
to suggest that they could be the basic materials from which genuinely intentional systems such 
as ourselves might be constructed (by, e.g., evolution).  The basic ingredients of intentionality 
are ubiquitous in the natural world. 
 Of course, trees, clouds of smoke, and skin don’t actually think; so there’s a good deal 
more work to be done to explain how these basic ingredients are exploited to produce genuine 
minds.  (Characteristically, philosophers disagree, vigorously, about how (and whether) this is to 
be done.  See, e.g., Millikan 1984, Dennett 1989, Fodor 1990, Dretske 1995.)  The central 
problem has been to distinguish intentional systems such as ourselves, which are capable of 
states that misrepresent the world, from purely informational systems, which cannot.  (Since an 
effect cannot occur uncaused, and is, necessarily, caused by whatever caused it, it’s not possible 
for it to carry misinformation about its cause.  To do so it would have to be caused by something 
that didn’t cause it.) 
 These conceptual breakthroughs have been a source of excitement and genuine hope that 
the longstanding mystery of what our minds (our cognitive minds, at least) are and how it is that 
we have them might be solved within the bounds of natural science.  Our phenomenal minds – 
our conscious experiences, with their qualitative characters – may remain a mystery (but see 
below); yet, given that the cognitive and the conscious are metaphysically distinct, we may 
nonetheless hope for a naturalistic explanation of a significant portion of our mental lives. 
 There are those, however, who deny that the problem of cognition (intentionality and 
rationality) and the problem of consciousness (qualitative experience) can be segregated in this 
way.  They persist in the Cartesian intuition that, somehow, there cannot be thought – or cannot 
 
3  The explicit construal of thinking as symbol manipulation can also be found in Hobbes. 
really be thought – or thinking in the absence of consciousness.4  John Searle, with his 
“Connection Principle”  is probably the best known of these, though there are others, such as 
Galen Strawson.  (See Searle 1992 and Strawson 1994.)  For such philosophers, though there are 
conscious states that are not thoughts, there’s something about what makes a mental state 
conscious that’s essential to making it intentional – i.e., to making it a thought. 
 One way of substantiating the Cartesian intuition is to provide reasons for thinking that 
there’s a “phenomenology” of conscious thinking, which is essential to its identity as thinking.  
To say that a state or process has a phenomenology is to say that it has features in virtue of which 
there’s “something it’s like” (in Nagel’s (1974) phrase) to be in it or to undergo it.  For example, 
the experience of being in pain has a distinctive sort of qualitative character (phenomenology), 
which is quite different from that of the experience of, say, hearing thunder or tasting chocolate:  
what it’s like to be in pain is quite different from what it’s like to hear thunder or to taste 
chocolate.  The thesis that there’s an essential phenomenology of conscious thought (which has 
been defended by, among others, Goldman (1993), Strawson (1994), Siewert (1998), Horgan and 
Tienson (2002) and Pitt (2004)) holds that there is something it’s like to consciously think a 
thought, which is distinctively cognitive (i.e., not visual or auditory or olfactory or gustatory or 
...), and which individuates the thought (makes it the thought that it is, and distinguishes it from 
other thoughts), in a way analogous to that in which, say, the distinctive auditory 
phenomenology of the sound of thunder distinguishes it from the sound of sleigh bells, or the 
distinctive gustatory phenomenology of the taste of chocolate distinguishes it from the taste of 
garlic.  What makes a mental state a thought is its having a distinctive phenomenology of the 
cognitive sort. 
 
4  Descartes himself held that consciousness and mentality are co-extensive – that is, all 
 Given the widely shared (but, in my view, not inevitable) intuition that in order for a state 
to have phenomenality (i.e., to be a phenomenal state) it must be conscious, this view has the 
problematic consequence that there can be no unconscious thoughts or thinking.  Given what we 
have learned from Freud and from contemporary cognitive science about the existence and, 
perhaps, primacy of unconscious mentation, however, it seems intellectually recidivist (at least) 
to advocate a return to a Cartesian view of the mind.  Searle and Strawson have attempted to 
tackle this problem – the former with the view (Searle 1991) that unconscious intentional states 
are, necessarily, potentially conscious, and the latter (Strawson 1994) with the view that though a 
particular state need not be conscious in order to be intentional, an unconscious state can only be 
intentional if it’s a state of a creature capable of being in conscious states.  Neither of these views 
seems completely satisfactory.  (What is the property that unconscious states have that can render 
them intentional?  Why should the intentionality of an unconscious state depend upon the 
consciousness of some other state?)  Though there are other ways one might try to face down the 
problem.  For example, one might simply bite the bullet and deny that in general consciousness 
is necessary for phenomenality.  This would of course break the connection between thought and 
consciousness, but not between thought and something very close to consciousness (viz., 
phenomenality, a necessary condition for it).5 
 One approach to the phenomenology of conscious states – representationalism (or 
intentionalism) – might be thought to be of some use here.  Representationalists (Dretske 1995, 
Tye 2000, Lycan 2006) hold that the phenomenal contents of conscious mental states are a 
species of intentional contents.  On this view, the qualitative features associated with a conscious 
 
and only conscious states and processes are mental. 
5  One might also deny that states conscious in themselves need be conscious for their 
possessor.  
perceptual state, those one would mention in characterizing what it’s like to be in that state, are 
the qualitative features of the thing(s) perceived.  They come to be associated with the perceptual 
state in virtue of the latter’s representing them, in a manner not essentially different from that in 
which intentional states such as thoughts and beliefs represent their contents.  (The styles of 
representation may be different – e.g., perceptual representations may have an image-like 
structure, while cognitive representations may have a sentence-like structure – but the features 
that determine which properties are represented are of the same basic type in both cases, viz., 
“tracking” or informational relations, of essentially the type suggested by Dretske.)  The 
qualitative feature one might mention in characterizing one’s visual experience of the sky at 
noon on a clear day, for example – the blueness – is a property of the sky, not of one’s 
experience.  (To maintain otherwise is to commit what Place (1956) termed the 
“Phenomenological Fallacy.”)  The only qualitative properties there are, are the qualitative 
properties of extramental objects; so there’s no special problem of explaining how a mental state 
could “have” conscious qualitative character.   
 Moreover, the explanation of the qualitative character of experiences on this type of 
theory is independent of the explanation of consciousness.  Typically, consciousness is explained 
in terms of first-order representation – a creature C is conscious of a thing x iff C is in a state S 
that represents x – where this first-order representational state need not itself be conscious (in the 
sense that its possessor need not be aware of being in it; such awareness requires a higher-order 
representation).  (See Dretkse 1995; Rosenthal 2005.)  Thus, on the representationalist account 
qualitative character and consciousness are metaphysically independent. 
 Representationalist approaches face two serious problems, however, one internal and the 
other in application to the present problem.  The internal problem is the explanation of the 
qualitative character of dreams and hallucinations – experiences in the absence of instantiated 
properties to represent.  Though this problem has been addressed (see Dretske, Tye and Lycan, 
op. cit.), it’s not clear that it has been solved.  In the context of phenomenally constituted thought 
content, the problem is the identification of objective qualitative properties to serve as cognitive 
phenomenal characters.   (But see Stalnaker 2008 for an attempt to come to grips with it.) 
                  David Pitt  
 
  References 
Dennett, D.C. (1989).  The Intentional Stance, Cambridge, MA:  The MIT Press. 
 
Dretske, F. (1981).  Knowledge and the Flow of Information, Cambridge, MA:  The MIT Press. 
 
Dretske, F. (1995).  Naturalizing the Mind, Cambridge, MA:  The MIT Press. 
 
Fodor, J.A. (1975).  The Language of Thought, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Fodor, J.A. (1990).  A Theory of Content and Other Essays, Cambridge, MA:  The MIT Press. 
 
Goldman, A (1993).  “The Psychology of Folk Psychology,” Behavioral and Brian Sciences 16, 
15-28. 
 
Horgan, T. and Tienson, J.  (2002).  “The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the 
Phenomenology of Intentionality,” in Philosophy of Mind, Classical and Contemporary 
Readings, D.J. Chalmers, ed., New York, NY:  Oxford University Press, 520-533  
 
Lycan, W.G. (2006).  Consciousness and Experience, Cambridge, MA:  The MIT Press. 
 
Millikan, R. (1984).  Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories, Cambridge, MA:  
The MIT Press. 
 
Nagel, T. (1974).  “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” Philosophical Review 83, 435-450. 
 
Pitt, D. (2004).  “The Phenomenology of Cognition, Or, What Is It Like to Think That P?” 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69, 1-36. 
 
Place, U.T. (1956).  “Is Consciousness a Brain Process?” British Journal of Psychology 47, 44-
50. 
 
Putnam, H. (1973/2002).  “The Nature of Mental States” (originally published as “Psychological 
Predicates,” in W.H. Capitan and D.D. Merrill, eds.,  Art, Mind, and Religion, Pittsburgh, PA: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 37-48), in Philosophy of Mind, Classical and Contemporary 
Readings, D.J. Chalmers, ed., New York, NY:  Oxford University Press, 73-79. 
 
Rosenthal, D. (2005).  Consciousness and Mind, New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
 
Searle, J.R. (1991).  “Consciousness, Unconsciousness and Intentionality,” in Philosophical 
Issues, I: Consciousness, E. Villanueva, ed., Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company, 
45-66. 
 
Searle, J.R. (1992).  The Rediscovery of the Mind, Cambridge, MA:  The MIT Press. 
 Siewert, C. (1998).  The Significance of Consciousness, Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University 
Press. 
 
Stalnaker, R. (2008).  Our Knowledge of the Internal World, New York, NY:  Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Strawson, G. (1994).  Mental Reality, Cambridge, MA:  The MIT Press. 
 
Turing, A. (1950).  “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” Mind 59, 433-460. 
 
Tye, M. (2000).  Consciousness, Color and Content, Cambridge, MA:  The MIT Press. 
